Domestic Relations by VanDoren, Elizabeth H.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 3 Article 6 
Winter 12-1-1976 
Domestic Relations 
Elizabeth H. VanDoren 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Elizabeth H. VanDoren, Domestic Relations, 28 S. C. L. Rev. 308 (1976). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. ALIMONY
In Smith v. Smith' the South Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted the alimony provisions of the South Carolina Code
2
to preclude an award of specific property. In reversing an earlier
trial court's order granting the husband a divorce on the grounds
of physical cruelty, the supreme court originally had remanded
the case and directed the trial court to increase the amount
awarded for child support and attorney's fees, and further had
directed the trial court to determine whether the wife was entitled
to alimony.' On remand, the trial court ordered the husband to
increase his child support payments to $70 per week, awarded
additional attorney fees to the wife in the amount of $350, and
denied any alimony to the wife, including her request for posses-
sion of the family home.4 The wife appealed on these three issues.'
The supreme court found no abuse of discretion by the trial
court and affirmed its determination on the questions of child
support' and attorney fees.7 However, rather than upholding the
1. 264 S.C. 624, 216 S.E.2d 541 (1975). This was the second time these parties were
before the court. See Smith v. Smith, 262 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53 (1974). For a discussion
of the first case see Domestic Relations, 1974 Survey of South Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L.
REv. 439, 445-48 (1975).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-113 (1962) provides:
Award of Alimony, etc.-In every judgment of divorce from the bonds of matri-
mony in a suit by the wife the court shall make such orders touching the mainte-
nance, alimony and suit money of the wife or any allowance to be made to her
and, if any, the security, to be given for the same, as from the circumstances of
the parties and nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just. But no alimony
shall be granted to an adulterous wife. In any award of permanent alimony, the
court shall have jurisdiction to order periodic payments or payment in a lump
sum,
S.C. CODE ANN. 20-113.1 (1962) provides:
In all actions for divorce a mensa et thoro, allowances of alimony and suit money
pendente lite shall be made according to the principles containing such allow-
ances in actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii.
3. 262 S.C. at 291, 204 S.E.2d at 53.
4. Record at 12.
5. Brief for Appellant at 3.
6. The court relied upon the well-settled rule that the amount to be awarded for child
support is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and should be determined in light
of the father's ability to pay. 264 S.C. at 628, 216 S.E.2d at 543, quoting Graham v.
Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970). It was quite apparent that the father could
not possibly pay more than the trial court had ordered. After child support and necessary
expenses were subtracted from his weekly income, the respondent retained two dollars to
pay for clothing, medical and dental expense, and attorneys' fees for himself and his wife.
Brief for Respondent at 1.
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trial court's denial of alimony as a valid exercise of judicial discre-
tion, the supreme court, through Chief Justice Moss, interpreted
sections 20-113 and 20-113.1 as restricting alimony to payments
in money and accordingly held that an award of specific property
was beyond the statutory power of the trial court.8
Throughout the proceedings, Mrs. Smith had requested the
court to convey to her the family home as alimony, suggesting
possession was necessary in order for her to properly raise her
children.9 The appellant requested either conveyance of her hus-
band's one-half interest in the house or "simply and solely the
exclusive and immediate possession of the house and the contents
until the youngest child obtains her majority."'"
The question of alimony had arisen on remand because the
supreme court had concluded the wife was not guilty of physical
cruelty, therefore allowing the possibility of an alimony award."
Although a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is denied for insufficient
evidence, the wife may still be awarded alimony in an action for
a divorce a mensa et thoro.'2 She need not be adjudged absolutely
blameless to be awarded alimony,'" but merely be found not
"guilty of substantial fault or misconduct 'which materially con-
tributed to the disruption of the marital relation.' ", In both the
original hearing for the divorce and in the rehearing after remand,
the trial court determined the wife's behavior to be the primary
reason for the marital disruption and weighed this factor heavily
when denying Mrs. Smith alimony.'" Since it would appear that
7. 264 S.C. at 631, 216 S.E.2d at 545.
8. Id. at 630-31, 216 S.E.2d at 544-45.
9. Record at 44. Appellant testified that living conditions for herself and her children
were extremely cramped. Brief for Appellant at 10-11. Appellant asserted that
it is inconsequential to her what [sic] she obtains possession of the home by
way of additional child support or by way of permanent alimony. The main
consideration is that these children need a home and the trial court has not seen
fit to place her and the children back in the home on Bucklevel Road and has
neither seen fit to give her sufficient funds with which to obtain a home of like
size and condition . ...
Brief for Appellant at 10. It is interesting to note appellant included her request for the
home as additional child support as well as permanent alimony. The supreme court did
not face the issue of whether property might be conveyed for child support.
10. Brief for Appellant at 11.
11. 262 S.C. at 297, 204 S.E.2d at 55.
12. Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
13. Miller v. Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 280. 82 S.E.2d 119, 122 (1954).
14. Welsh v. Welsh, 250 S.C. 264, 268, 157 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1967).
15. In his order, Judge Anderson discussed the fault factor in denying the wife
alimony:
1976]
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the trial court acted clearly within its discretion, the supreme
court could have validly upheld the denial of alimony on this
basis, rather than finding a lack of statutory power.'6 Indeed, the
major significance of the decision lies in the restraints it may have
unwittingly imposed upon future courts which attempt to fashion
adequate awards of alimony.
The issue of the court's power to award property as alimony
has generally been one of statutory construction, and most courts
have held that absent "express statutory authority. . . the court
possesses no power to vest in the wife title to a specific portion of
the husband's real estate as alimony." 7 Theoretically, the wife is
not entitled to the corpus of her husband's estate since alimony
is conceived to be an allowance out of the earnings or income of
the husband for her nourishment and support.'" It is not intended
to place the wife in a better situation by conveying to her a fee
simple from her husband's estate. Where the alimony statute
does not specifically provide for payment of alimony out of the
real or personal estate of the husband, the courts will generally
not imply the power.'" Nevertheless some courts have specifically
As to fault it was determined in the first action that behavior of the defendant
wife was the primary cause of the break up of the home. . . .This court was
convinced then and is still of the opinion that the fault in this family break up
was much more that of the wife than that of the husband. It is uncontradicted
that Mr. Smith had adequately supported his family; that he took great pride
in the upkeep and appearance of the home and that although the marital discord
had continued for many years and as he stated his wife had caused him to "live
in pure hell," he had attempted to keep the home together for the sake of the
children.
Record at 5-6.
16. The court explained:
The general rule is that the word "alimony" is restricted to payments in money.
We think that the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that our
statute contemplates the payment of alimony in money. This being true, the
court has no power to award any specific property of the husband as alimony.
264 S.C. at 630-31, 216 S.E.2d at 544.
17. Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, 128 Vs. 449, 451, 104 S.E. 804, 804 (1920). The South
Carolina Supreme Court relied on Lloyd v. Lloyd, 183 Ga. 751, 189 S.E.2d 903 (1937), in
its reasoning:
(Tihe term [alimonyl is derived from a Latin word which primarily meant to
nourish; that is, to supply the necessities of life . . . . "'Alimony' is a technical
word, theoretically restricted to personalty, and practically to money."
Id. at 752-53, 189 S.E. at 904 (1937), cited at 264 S.C. at 630-31, 216 S.E.2d at 544.
18. See Games v. Games, 111 W. Va. 327, 161 S.E. 560 (1931).
19. See generally Annot., 133 A.L.R. 860 (1941). Georgia law on this question presents
an exception. GA. ANN. CODE § 30-201 (1969) which is silent on the question of whether
alimony may be awarded in specific property reads:
3
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allowed the transfer of property to the wife as permanent ali-
mony,"0 while others have conditioned conveyance upon the na-
ture of the proceeding." And finally, at least one court has inter-
preted its statute to allow transfer of title but not require it.22
Clearly the South Carolina alimony statute makes no mention of
real property nor of the husband's estate generally, and although
some courts have allowed transfer of specific property as alimony
without express authority, the South Carolina court is in accord
with many jurisdictions in reaching its decision to the contrary.
Because of the supreme court's rather general holding, many
questions may arise regarding the scope of the decision. The opin-
ion was unqualified, stating flatly that specific property may not
be awarded as alimony. Other jurisdictions, while forbidding
property transfers generally, have refused to deny categorically
that circumstances might exist which would justify such a trans-
fer.2 Equitable considerations generally guide the courts in deter-
mining whether sufficient circumstances are present to award
Alimony is an allowance out of the husband's estate, made for the support of
the wife when living separate from him. It is either temporary or permanent.
The Georgia court, however, has interpreted this statute as allowing the wife title or use
of property belonging to the husband. Standridge v. Standridge, 224 Ga. 102, 160 S.E.2d
377 (1968); Jones v. Jones, 220 Ga. 753, 141 S.E.2d 457 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 162 Ga.
349, 133 S.E. 842 (1926).
20. See, e.g., Ex parte Thompson, 282 Ala. 248, 210 So. 2d 808 (1968); O'Bannon v.
O'Bannon, 257 Ala. 246, 58 So. 2d 779 (1952); Oatley v. Oatley, 133 Fla. 848, 183 So. 497
(1938); Garver v. Garver, 184 Kan. 145, 334 P.2d 408 (1959); Murphy v. Murphy, 276 P.2d
920 (Okla. 1954).
21. Cf. Osman v. Osman, 86 Kan. 519, 121 P. 327 (1912) (real estate of the husband
may be set apart to the wife in actions of alimony alone, as well as for divorce and
alimony).
22. In Spillers v. Spillers, 212 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. App. 1975) the court observed:
This statute in no way renders it mandatory or incumbent upon the trial court
to order any transfer of property as part of the wife's alimony. . . . Undoubt-
edly the court could have required the defendant to transfer some of his assets
to plaintiff. However, his failure to do so does not constitute abuse of discretion
212 S.E.2d at 679.
23. See, e.g., Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, 128 Va. 449, 104 S.E. 804 (1920). The Maryland
Court in Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 A. 95 (1931), while holding such circumstan-
ces were not extant in the case, nevertheless left open the possibility that such a transfer
could be justified.
[I]n the absence of peculiar and compelling circumstances, she should not be
granted the exclusive possession of any part of the husband's property . . ..
There may possibly be circumstances under which such a provision could be
sustained as necessary for the effective operation of the decree, or the protection
of the wife, but we find no such facts in this case.
Id. at 523-24, 154 A. at 99-100.
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss3/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
property. Thus courts have awarded property to the wife where
she owned the house prior to her marriage,24 and where the hus-
band was too irresponsible to be allowed to retain the family
business.21 One court defined "special equities" to embrace situa-
tions where title to property was held by one party but both
parties had contributed substantially to its accumulation.
2
1
Where property was given to one spouse by the other, that same
court suggested that the property be returned to the donor with-
out regard to the voluntariness of the gift, or to make an equitable
division between the parties. 2 It would be hoped that the South
Carolina Supreme Court would recognize, as other states have,
the inherent desirability of retaining a flexible rule to provide for
equitable transfers of property as alimony where the situation
merits.
The Smith decision should have no effect upon the court's
power to assist in property settlements incident to a divorce.
Disposition of property between parties during a divorce is not
expressly authorized by South Carolina's statute, although the
court has long recognized its power to settle disputed claims to
property under its equity jurisdiction. 2 However, if the trial
24. Rovder v. Rovder, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 171, 78 N.E.2d 422 (1946). The court therein
reasoned:
[Als a matter of common justice, the wife ought not, after giving her all for
eleven years to her second marriage, come out of this domestic wreckage without
the homestead property which she bought and built before her second marriage
Id. at 174-75, 78 N.E.2d at 423-24.
25. Halberstadt v. Halberstadt, 72 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1954). The court found the hus-
band "had no affinity for good manners and was allergic to consistent labor. Some of his
antics, such as spitting on his wife, were child stuff or the conduct of an emotional moron."
Id. at 812. The court determined under these circumstances that awarding the restaurant
to the wife who had actually managed the business for some time was the only decision
that "comported with reason." Id.
26. Bissett v. Bissett, 375 I1. 551, 555-56, 31 N.E.2d 955, 958 (1941).
27. Id; see Kohl v. Montgomery, 373 Il1. 200, 25 N.E.2d 826 (1940) (court allowed a
property transfer to the wife where the property was acquired from the wife's family and
the husband contributed nothing); Shekerjian v. Shekerjian, 346 Ill. 101, 178 N.E. 365
(1931) (wife assisted husband in his business, husband owned no property before their
marriage, and the wife's frugality and sacrifices substantially contributed to her hus-
band's acquisition of the family home). See also 30 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 280 (1952).
A similar argument was raised in the South Carolina case of McKenzie v. McKenzie,
254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970). On appeal, the wife claimed that the refusal of the
trial court to transfer the home and all of its furnishings to her was against the equitable
principles described in Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill. 551, 31 N.E.2d 955 (1941). The court
refused to decide the question because the wife had failed to raise the issue at the circuit
court level. 254 S.C. at 375, 175 S.E.2d at 630.
28. Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961). Since the South Carolina
5
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court's decree fails to specifically identify the award as either
alimony or a property settlement,29 the supreme court may either
reverse under Smith by finding the award to be alimony or be
forced to remand to the trial court for a determination of the
exact nature of the award."
Smith may have an even more profound impact on another
aspect of South Carolina divorce law. Mrs. Smith not only re-
quested conveyance of her husband's one-half interest in the
home, but also, in the alternative, requested exclusive use and
possession until her youngest child reached majority.31 In summa-
rily denying the house as alimony, the court was conspicuously
silent regarding the appropriateness of allowing the wife use of
the house, either as a life estate reverting to the husband at her
death or for a term ending when her youngest child obtained
majority. The unfortunate inference is that any interest in prop-
erty, including use, has been precluded by this decision, absent
an agreement between the parties providing otherwise. There
appears to be no uniformity in other jurisdictions on this issue, 2
although the more logical solution would seem to be to allow use
of specific property by the wife as alimony in situations where the
facts would justify such an order. If the more flexible approach
court has not faced this situation since Smith, it should be noted that Virginia, a jurisdic-
tion which similarly denies the transfer of specific property as alimony, has upheld its
authority to approve agreements between the parties settling property rights and claims
for alimony. Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S.E. 902 (1925).
29. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 450-51 (1968). Clark suggests
that courts routinely fail to separate alimony awards from property settlements.
30. The practioner may obviate this problem by insuring that the trial court properly
identifies the award.
31. Brief for Appellant note 10 supra.
32. In Pierce v. Pierce the court denied conveyance of title to the wife as alimony but
explained the holding did not preclude the chancellor from allowing use of the house for
the wife and children as part of the support owed by the husband. 267 So. 2d 300, 302
(Miss. 1972). Accord, Thrift v. Thrift, 54 Mont. 463, 171 P. 272 (1918) (court could grant
the property for a limited period, but could not order conveyance of the fee simple).
Contra, Shreffler v. Shreffler, 31 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1930) (court is without the power
to decree the use of the home to the wife).
For guidance in predicting the possibility of allowing the use of property as alimony,
it is helpful to consider the case of Lloyd v. Lloyd, 183 Ga. 751, 189 S.E. 903 (1937), which
was relied upon by the South Carolina court in Smith. The court in Lloyd, although
refusing to grant conveyance in fee to the wife, determined that she was entitled to use of
the house. The Lloyd court explained that although alimony does not properly come from
the corpus of the husband's estate, it may include the income from that estate. Thus, since
the wife would be entitled to the rents obtained from the house, the court refused to
distinguish between allowing her the income and allowing her use. 183 Ga. at 754, 189 S.E.
at 904.
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suggested here were not adopted, every divorce or legal separation
in South Carolina would potentially require displacement of chil-
dren from their familiar environment, which would unnecessarily
result in an even greater disruption in the children's lives.3u As a
matter of policy, the court should not adopt a self-limiting ap-
proach to this important aspect of divorce and alimony.
Another factor which must be considered in evaluating the
impact of Smith, is the question of whether a quasi in rem action
which attaches the property of a nonresident husband to secure
jurisdiction for an award of alimony will continue to be available
in the state. It is well settled that while an action for divorce is
an in rem proceeding,34 a claim for alimony is a personal claim
against the spouse 5 and thus requires personal jurisdiction. 6
Since constructive service by publication or actual service out of
state will not secure in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
spouse,3" courts have provided for a quasi in rem proceeding in
which property belonging to the absent spouse and located within
the boundaries of the state is brought before the court. The prop-
erty secures the jurisdiction for the alimony award, which will be
limited by the value of the property attached.
3
1
Arguably, Smith could be interpreted to preclude in rem
proceedings against property for alimony. If the decision is
strictly applied, any judgment rendered against property would
be invalid. However, other jurisdictions which refuse to award
33. One obvious exception to this automatic displacement arises when the parties can
amicably decide their living arrangements out of court.
34. E.g., Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252 (1934).
35. Lovegrove v. Lovegrove, 128 Va. 449, 451, 104 S.E. 804 (1920).
36. Carnie v. Carnie, 252 S.C. 471, 167 S.E.2d 297 (1969). See generally 24 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 350, 351 (1946).
37. E.g., Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877); Carnie v. Carnie, 252 S.C. 471, 167 S.E.2d 297 (1969).
38. Knight v. Knight, 211 S.C. 25, 43 S.E.2d 610 (1947); Matheson v. McCormac, 186
S.C. 93, 195 S.E.2d 122 (1938) (reversing the lower court because the wife neither secured
personal jurisdiction over the husband, nor attached his property to effect in rem jurisdic-
tion).
In Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917), the Court enumerated two
essential elements for an in rem proceeding for alimony: the property must be located
within the state's borders, and it must be seized by way of injunction, attachment, or other
appropriate remedy at the beginning of the proceedings. Once these elements exist,
a decree for alimony against an absent defendant will be valid under the same
circumstances and to the same extent as if the judgment were on a debt-that
is, it will be valid not in personam, but as a charge to be satisfied out of the
property seized.
243 U.S. at 272.
[Vol. 28
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property as alimony have generally allowed these kinds of in rem
proceedings." Conversely, to deny the court jurisdiction over a
nonresident through attachment would make it
'possible for the deserting husband, though possessed of visible
property in abundance within the control of the court, to cross
the state line, and in security, laugh at the inability of the law
to afford relief to the abandoned wife and children. 40
Surely the South Carolina court does not intend to avail the
nonresident husband with such an obvious means of escaping his
support obligation. Presumably the court will continue to insure
alimony awards by allowing the attachment of property of those
husbands who refuse to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the
court.
However, even if South Carolina continues to permit such
quasi in rem proceedings, it is questionable whether the wife
would be entitled to retain the property permanently. Prior to
Smith, the South Carolina Supreme Court vested fee simple title
in the wife, allowing her to convey the fee to a third person.4' In
the words of the court, the "property, whether realty or person-
alty, may be appropriated as alimony and decreed to the wife in
satisfaction of the award."4 Perhaps in light of Smith the court
will treat quasi in rem alimony awards as a mere lien against the
property to secure payment, requiring conversion of the property
into cash to satisfy the judgment.43 Inevitably, the problem be-
39. Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969). Maryland expressly
allows an action against a nonresident husband. MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 4 (1973)
provides:
In any decree for divorce against a nonresident, where alimony is prayed in
the bill of complaint, and the same sets forth that the nonresident defendant is
possessed of property in the State, the court shall have full authority to award
alimony, and any property in the State of any person against whom alimony
may be so awarded shall be liable for the same and subject to such decree as
the court may pass in the premises. Any order of the court awarding alimony
pendente lite shall have the same force and effect as in decree for divorce.
See also Note, Alimony and Property Settlement Agreements in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REv.
710, 714 (1956).
40. Case Note, Award ofAlimony Against Non-Resident Defendant Having Property-
Within the State, Keen v. Keen, 10 MD. L. REv. 277, 278-79 (1949), quoting Wilder v.
Wilder, 93 Vt. 105, 108, 106 A. 562, 563 (1919).
41. Matheson v. McCormac, 187 S.C. 260, 196 S.E. 883 (1938). See also the earlier
proceedings between the two parties, Matheson v. McCormac, note 38 supra. In the second
proceeding, attachment was properly accomplished and the court allowed the property to
vest in the wife.
42. 186 S.C. at 102, 195 S.E. at 126 (emphasis omitted).
43. One writer, commenting on Virginia's alimony law, declared alimony to be avail-
1976]
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comes one of the semantics of what is in fact a property interest
and whether such an interest is embraced within the meaning of
Smith.
It is unfortunate the supreme court chose the Smith facts to
announce their interpretation of the alimony provisions, for the
opinion could easily have been avoided by affirming the trial
court's discretion to deny the wife alimony. But more impor-
tantly, the decision which purports to fashion a simple, easy-to-
apply rule of law fails to consider the many ramifications of such
a rigid approach. The state's interest in equitably resolving mari-
tal conflicts often necessitates a greater degree of flexibility. Per-
haps the supreme court will in future decisions find it properly
within statutory authority to award property as alimony when
equity so demands and seriously consider the implications of de-
nying the use of the family home to one who has custody of minor
children.4 Continuing adherence to the seemingly inflexible deci-
sion announced in Smith would result in a severe limitation of the
options available to the trial courts which must determine ali-
mony awards.
I. CONTEMPT
The South Carolina Code empowers the court to invoke its
contempt power against one who fails to pay alimony or child
support.45 The complainant establishes a prima facie case of con-
able through a quasi in rem proceeding against a husband outside of the court's jurisdic-
tion, but qualified the statement by asserting "the decree as such cannot make an award
of specific property." 42 VA. L, REV. at 714. This would suggest that property so attached
could never be retained by the wife.
When the alimony award is equal to or exceeds the value of the property, it appears
senseless to require the sale of the attached property. For if the wife is entitled to the
proceeds from the sale of the property, it follows that she could borrow the money, pur-
chase the property, and eventually be in the same position had the court initially awarded
her the property following the default judgment.
44. Six months after the Smith decision was rendered, the court decided Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 266 S.C. 23, 221 S.E.2d 113 (1975), which involved an appeal by the husband of
a lower court order to convey his fee simple in the house to his wife. Divorce was the only
relief requested by the wife in her complaint, and the husband failed to answer and
defaulted. When the lower court judge granted the divorce, he also ordered the husband
to convey the fee. Without reference to the Smith holding, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed on the grounds that relief granted by the lower court cannot exceed that
requested in the complaint. Since the husband defaulted on the basis of the complaint, it
was outside the authority of the court to later increase the relief sought.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1274 (1962) provides:
Failure to pay support money contempt.-The failure to pay into court alimony
or maintenance and support ordered by the court to be so paid or the violation
[Vol. 28
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tempt by evincing proof of a court order requiring such payments
and a subsequent failure to receive these payments.46 The finan-
cial inability of the defendant to comply with the order is a valid
defense to contempt if such inability was not a result of the willful
conduct of the defendant." In the recent case of Bigham v.
Bigham,48 the supreme court's discussion of contempt revealed a
marked disagreement among the justices as to the nature of the
defense of financial inability.
In the present case,49 the husband failed to appear at a show
cause hearing, and his attorney stipulated that no payments had
been made since June 1973.11 The trial judge found the husband
in contempt." At the divorce hearing, the trial judge granted the
wife a divorce on the grounds of desertion and awarded the wife
attorney's fees. Having reduced the husband's arrearage in sup-
port payments by the amount of the attorney's fees, the judge
of any of the orders of the court shall be deemed contempt of court within the
meaning of item (18) of § 15-1225.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1225(18) (1962) provides:
In the exercise of its jurisdiction the court shall have power:
(18) To punish any person guilty of a contempt of court as provided by law
46. Mixson v. Mixson, 253 S.C. 436, 443, 171 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1969).
47. Id.; Accord, State ex rel. Casey v. Casey, 175 Or. 328, 337, 153 P.2d 700, 703
(1944). Other defenses have been offered to justify contempt but are generally rejected by
the courts. The defense of a lack of understanding of the order has been dismissed, Gay
v. Gay, 421 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1967); and it is well settled that remarriage is not a justifica-
tion for present inability to comply, Honaker v. Honaker, 267 Ky. 129, 101 S.W.2d 679
(1937). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 223 Ga. 664, 157 S.E.2d 453 (1967) which reversed a
contempt order only because the lower court did not make a finding of the exact amount
of the arrearage. The Georgia Supreme Court also dismissed the husband's defense of
inability to comply, finding that he was quite able to pay at the time the support pay-
ments were due.
48. 264 S.C. 101, 212 S.E.2d 594 (1975).
49. This was the second time the parties had been before the court. See Bigham v.
Bigham, 262 S.C. 62, 202 S.E.2d 177 (1974). In the first case the supreme court reversed
a lower court order terminating alimony and granting the husband a divorce on the
grounds of adultery reasoning that the husband had failed to raise the issue of adultery
in the pleadings, but instead raised it informally at the hearing. This failure to put the
wife on notice, the court maintained, denied her a reasonable opportunity to meet the
charges. Id. at 65-66, 202 S.E.2d at 178. The husband was found in contempt of the first
order for his willful refusal to pay alimony. His only defense to the contempt was his wife's
alleged adultery. The supreme court in discussing the first contempt remarked:
[T]he trial judge found that the charges of misconduct had been established.
Such misconduct, however, was held to constitute no defense to the contempt
charges . ..
Id. at 65, 202 S.E.2d at 178.
50. Record at 9.
51. Id. at 10.
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further ordered that payment by the husband of $2500.00 would
represent attorneys fees and all past, present and future alimony
owed by him. 2 The supreme court, Justice Ness writing for the
majority, reversed the lower court's order reducing past due sup-
port and terminating future payments. He reasoned that the trial
court had not properly considered the issue"3 because no testi-
mony was offered by the husband at either the contempt or the
divorce hearing on the issues of modification of alimony or on the
financial condition of either party. 4
The wife contended before the supreme court that the issue
of modification of past due support payments had not been pro-
perly before the trial court.'- Rejecting this argument, the su-
preme court maintained that the husband had raised the issue by
his counterclaim requesting the court to vacate its order.56 Such
a request impliedly carries a concomitant request to retroactively
modify a prior decree, a rule recognized in Ex parte Jeter,57 which
52. The reduction of the past due alimony served to require the defendant to pay only
that which was owed by him prior to the divorce decree. His arrearage at the contempt
hearing amounted to $2200.00, increased by $300 at the time of the final decree.
53. 264 S.C. at 104-05, 212 S.E.2d at 596.
54. Record at 12. The trial judge did note, however, that the wife had been recently
employed and was self-supporting, and that the husband had changed employment al-
though there was no evidence regarding his present income. Id. at 13.
55. Brief for Appellant at 5.
56. 264 S.C. at 103, 212 S.E.2d at 595-96.
57. 193 S.C. 278, 8 S.E.2d 490 (1940). Jeter held that support payments may be
modified retroactively for financial inability to comply or ill health. To hold otherwise,
the court explained, would make contempt proceedings automatic. Id. at 284, 8 S.E.2d
at 492-93. Modification of alimony is also provided for by statute. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
116 (1962) reads:
Whenever any husband, pursuant to a judgment of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony, has been required to make his wife any periodic payments of ali-
mony and the circumstances of the parties or the financial ability of the hus-
band shall have been changed since the rendition of such judgment, either party
may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order and judgment
decreasing or increasing the amount of such alimony payments or terminating
such payments and the court, after giving both parties an opportunity to be
heard and to introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall make such order and
judgment as justice and equity shall require, with due regard to the changed
circumstances and the financial ability of the husband, decreasing or increasing
or confirming the amount of alimony provided for in such original judgment or
terminating such payments. Thereafter the husband shall pay and be liable to
pay the amount of alimony payments directed in such order and judgment and
no other or further amount and such original judgment, for the purpose of all
actions or proceedings of every nature and wherever instituted, whether within
or without this State, shall be deemed to be, and shall be, modified accordingly,
subject in every case to a further proceeding or proceedings under the provisions
of this section in relation to such modified judgment.
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was cited approvingly by the court in Bigham.
To this extent the entire court agreed. However, while con-
curring in result, Justices Lewis and Bussey took issue with the
majority's discussion of contempt and the necessity of consider-
ing the defendant's financial ability to comply with the order.
The majority ruled that
[c]ontempt is an extreme measure; this power vested in a court
is not lightly asserted. Prior to invoking this power the court
must necessarily consider the ability of the defendant to comply
with the order. Contempt results from the willful disobedience
of an order of the court. Before a person may be held in con-
tempt, "the record must be clear and specific as to the acts or
conduct upon which such finding is based."''
Justice Bussey interpreted this reasoning and the majority's cita-
tion to Jeter, to imply, if not expressly require "that any time the
contempt power of the court is invoked the court must, ex mero
motu, raise and consider the ability of a defendant to comply with
a prior order of the court, and consequently whether or not such
should be retroactively modified."59 He reasoned further that the
burden is on the defendant to establish his own defense to con-
tempt once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case."
It is debatable whether the majority opinion in fact requires
the issue of the ability to comply and the subsequent considera-
tion of modification to be resolved in every contempt proceeding.
While it is true that the majority did observe that "'the record
must be clear and specific'" before contempt may be invoked,"1
this is far from explicitly stating that the defendant is thereby
relieved of his burden of presenting the issue as to his financial
condition. This aspect is borne out by the ultimate resolution of
the case, for the court specifically reversed the lower court's modi-
fication of the decree on grounds that no evidence was presented
to justify it. 2 If the defendant neither raises the issue in his plead-
ings nor attempts to present evidence at the hearing, a contempt
decree presumably would follow, as it did in Bigham.
58. 264 S.C. at 104, 212 S.E.2d at 596.
59. Id. at 105, 212 S.E.2d at 596-97.
60. Id. at 105, 212 S.E.2d at 597. Other jurisdictions similarly require the defendant
to bear the burden of proof. See, e.g., Fambrough v. Cannon, 221 Ga. 289, 144 S.E.2d 335
(1965); Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 23 Tenn. 359, 133 S.W.2d 617 (1939).
61. 264 S.C. at 104, 212 S.E.2d at 596.
62. Id. Indeed, if the burden is not upon the defendant, the court should have re-
manded with directions that such evidence be properly raised.
1976]
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The focus of the majority opinion undoubtedly concerned
those instances where the defendant failed to plead financial ina-
bility but subsequently attempts to present evidence of the same
as a defense to contempt. The majority seemingly would require
the court to consider such evidence. 3 Apparently the justification
for relaxing the requirement of pleading formalities" stems from
the severity of the contempt sanction.
Because the court did not apply this discussion to the
Bigham facts but instead reversed on other grounds, it is difficult
to determine the full import of the opinion. Although the
reasoning which disturbs the dissent is arguably dicta, it could
be asserted as a precedent that potential retroactive modification
of support payments and the financial inability of the defendant,
whether pleaded or not, must be considered in every contempt
proceeding.65
63. The South Carolina Supreme Court discussed the necessity of proving allegations
in Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 384, 25 S.E.2d 243 (1943).
The allegations of a pleading merely affirm propositions which are to be estab-
lished by proof. It is a truism that allegation without proof is as unavailing as
proof without allegation. Not only is it essential that every fact necessary to
constitute a cause of action or defense be pleaded, but every such fact, if in issue,
must be proved.
Id. at 391, 25 S.E.2d at 246 (emphasis added). This would appear to be not only a
requirement of proof, but also of pleading. If the majority has eliminated the requirement
of pleading financial inability to comply in contempt proceedings, it would be a departure
from this reasoning.
64. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 591, 592-94 (1957). There are few cases on
point, and there is no discernable general rule. See, e.g., Stafford v. Stafford, 27 Misc. 2d
9, 203 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (requiring sufficient pleadings in a cross-motion for
modification to justify being heard on the defense of financial inability). But see State v.
Matheny, 188 Ore. 502, 216 P.2d 270 (1950) (no requirement of formal pleading of inability
to comply as a defense to a contempt order).
65. The dissent correctly reasons that Jeter does not provide support for the majority
opinion. In Jeter, the husband pleaded financial inability to comply and requested
retroactive modification. It would not appear unreasonable to require the defendant in a
contempt proceeding to present a defense for his failure to comply with the decree. At the
time of the initial order, the court necessarily must consider the financial condition of both
parties and the order should reflect the court's findings. If the financial condition of the
parties is measurably altered, it would seem proper for the party so affected to petition
the court for modification. Conversely, to merely disregard the order without a petition
for modification would tend to manifest the need for the defendant to plead affirmatively
the defense at the contempt hearing. See Hays v. Hays, 216 Ind. 62, 22 N.E.2d 971 (1939)
where the court commented upon the defendant's failure to appeal the original order and
held that the defendant had the "burden of pleading and proving to the satisfaction of
the court such facts as would show his inability to comply with the original order." Id. at
66, 22 N.E.2d at 973.
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III. ADOPTION
In South Carolina, adoption requires written consent of both
natural parents unless they are made a party to the proceeding
or unless parental rights have been judicially terminated." Paren-
tal rights may be terminated upon a finding that the parents have
willfully failed to visit or support the child for six consecutive
months preceding an action to declare the child abandoned."7 The
supreme court may have extended its definition of abandonment
by considering a parent's incarceration as a strong indication of
willful disregard and avoidance of parental obligations. In
Hamby v. Hamby,"5 the supreme court upheld an adoption over
the objection of the nonconsenting father who had been impris-
oned almost the entire life of the child. Confined on three sepa-
rate occasions since the birth of his daughter and remaining in
prison during the adoption proceedings, the appellant had spent
only eight months out of prison in the past nine years. 9 Although
the father visited his daughter three times during his release in
1968, the mother asserted he had been drinking during those
visits.7 0 During his incarceration his only contact with the child
had been through a Christmas card in 1971 and a letter in
October 1973,71 five months prior to commencement of the action.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.7 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides in part:
Written Consent required.-An adoption of a child may be decreed when there
have been filed written consents to adoption executed by:
(a) Both parents, if living, or the surviving parent, "regardless of age"
of a legitimate child; provided, that consent shall not be required from
one whose parental rights have been judicially terminated, or from one
who has been made a party to the adoption proceedings and duly served
67. S.C. ConE ANN. § 31-61 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides inter alia:
Who is abandoned or abused child.-For the purposes of this chapter, an aban-
doned child shall be:
(1) A child whose parents have willfully failed to visit or have willfully
failed to support or make payments toward his support for six consecutive
months immediately preceding institution of an action or proceeding to
declare the child to be an abandoned child. ...
68. 264 S.C. 614, 216 S.E.2d 536 (1975).
69. Id. at 617-18, 216 S.E.2d at 538. The father spent seven months out ofjail between
his first and second confinements, and only 42 days separated his last release and subse-
quent conviction. The mother obtained a divorce for extreme cruelty during his first
release in November 1968 and appellant was reincarcerated two months later. During his
second confinement, Mrs. Hamby and her new husband moved to another city. Record
at 16-17.
70. Record at 17.
71. Id. at 18.
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss3/6
322 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw [Vol. 28
The mother also maintained that the father had never provided
support for the child except during the first month of the child's
life.2 The appellant admitted he did not provide support, but
contended that his virtually constant incarceration prevented
him from doing so.13
The supreme court, through Justice Lewis, affirmed the
adoption order and the lower court's finding of abandonment by
the father. While emphasizing the appellant's lack of contact
with the child during his short intervals of freedom, the supreme
court also viewed as significant the father's repeated incarcera-
tion for acts of lawlessness, as well as his negligible contact with
the child during his confinement. 4
Adoption is a creature of statute and was not available at
common law. "The transfer of the natural rights of the parents
to their children was against its policy and repugnant to its prin-
ciples." 5 As a result, the rights of the parents are generally con-
sidered paramount to those of the child. 6 The burden of showing
72. Id. at 17.
73. Brief for Appellant at 4. The father conceded that if he failed to provide support
for six consecutive months following his release, his parental rights could be terminated.
Id. at 5.
74. 264 S.C. at 618, 216 S.E.2d at 538-39.
75. Driggers v. Jolley, 219 S.C. 31, 36, 64 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1951).
76. See In Re Adoption of Jacona, 426 Pa. 98, 231 A.2d 295 (1967); Johnson v. Strick-
land, 88 Ga. App. 281, 76 S.E.2d 533 (1953). The South Carolina Supreme Court remains
ambivalent in its interpretation of the supremacy of parental rights in contested adoption
proceedings. In Goff v. Benedict, 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269 (1969), the court declared
that the adoption statute providing for termination of parental rights would be strictly
construed in favor of the natural parent and the preservation of the parent-child relation-
ship. Id. at 87-88, 165 S.E.2d at 271 (1969). Yet in a later case, the court asserted:
In making such a determination, the best interest of the child as well as the
rights of parents are involved, and the completeness of the relinquishment of
parental rights to constitute abandonment must be determined upon the basis
of a due consideration of both.
Bevis v. Bevis, 254 S.C. 345, 351, 175 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1970).
The extent of emphasis the South Carolina court places on the child's interest is
unclear from its opinions. In contrast to child custody proceedings where the child's best
interests are always controlling, the nature of contested adoption proceedings are such
that the courts should properly emphasize parental rights, since abandonment is a prere-
quisite for eliminating the need for consent. Even if a court is unable to find abandonment,
custody of the child may nevertheless remain undisturbed. See McCormick v. McMurray,
260 S.C. 452, 196 S.E.2d 642 (1973). In McCormick, the mother had delivered her daughter
to the petitioners with the agreement that she would consent to adoption. When the
mother later changed her mind, the petitioners attempted to have her rights judicially
terminated on grounds of abandonment. The court found force of circumstances or "dire
necessity" justifying the mother's conduct and refused to find abandonment. Id. at 455-
56, 196 S.E.2d at 644. However, the court stated that the denial of the adoption did not
15
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abandonment rests with the adopting parent,7" and once estab-
lished, the court may then properly consider whether adoption
would be in the best interests of the child.
78
Abandonment has been defined by the supreme court as "a
voluntary act or conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a
parent to the child."79 As a general rule,
"abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinguish all parental claims to the child . . ." It does not
include an act or course of conduct which is done through force
of circumstances or from dire necessity."
Abandonment of a child for the purposes of relinquishing all par-
ental claims contemplates a voluntary act, with the primary in-
tention being the severing of parental relations. Thus a court
would not find abandonment where the mother was separated
from her child by process of the court"1 or where the mother re-
fused to allow the father to visit the child.2z Courts have also
refused to allow adoption without consent when the parent left
the child in the custody of another without providing support. 3
Nevertheless, courts will quickly find abandonment where a par-
affect custody, which is controlled by the best interest of the child. Id. at 457, 196 S.E.2d
at 644. See also Jackson v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951) where the court
denied the adoption, finding no abandonment even though the court believed it better for
the child to be with her grandparents.
77. Goff v. Benedict, 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269 (1969).
78. In re Adoption of Jacona, 426 Pa. 98, 100, 231 A.2d 295, 296 (1967).
79. Bevis v. Bevis, 254 S.C. 345, 351, 175 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1970).
80. Id. The court suggested abandonment is fundamentally a question of intent to
be determined from the facts in each case. Id.
81. In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P.161 (1912).
82. Ford v. Litton, 211 So. 2d 871 (Miss. 1968).
83. In Wheeler v. Little, 113 Ga. App. 106, 147 S.E.2d 352 (1966) the father left his
daughter with his sister for over eight years without contributing substantial support. The
sister obtained legal custody and later petitioned for adoption. The court refused to find
abandonment, explaining that the father's frequent contact with the child negated inten-
tional relinquishment of parental rights. See also Brazelle v. Anderson, 113 Ga. App. 15,
146 S.E.2d 921 (1966) where the court stated:
The mere leaving of a child in custody of another for a length of time (here,
approximately nine years) does not constitute abandonment. ... Failure to
supply the child with the necessities of life, though an element of abandonment,
is not alone sufficient, and this is particularly true as to the natural mother; the
duty of affording the necessities being that of the father.
Id. at 15-16, 146 S.E.2d at 922-23. Another court held as a matter of law that a divorced
father cannot desert a child in the custody of his mother, and if no child support was
ordered, a failure to provide support does not constitute abandonment. Ex parte Payne,
301 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1957).
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ent has failed to visit or communicate with the child, interpreting
such conduct as an indication of intentional disregard of parental
obligations."'
In Hamby the supreme court noted the infrequency of con-
tact between the appellant and his child. Three visits and two
pieces of correspondence in nine years is hardly convincing evi-
dence of parental concern, and perhaps the court was correct in
interpreting such lack of communication as sufficient to establish
abandonment. However, as appellant argued, his last contact did
occur less than six months prior to the commencement of the
action."5 Since the South Carolina statute specifically requires
abandonment to have continued for at least six months preceding
the action, the court apparently decided against a strict construc-
tion of section 31-61,86 and instead resolved to consider each case
on the particular facts presented."
While Hamby represents a holding of abandonment where
contact is limited, it is uncertain to what extent the supreme
court emphasized the father's repeated incarceration in affirming
the adoption. After discussing its interpretation of voluntary
abandonment,8 the court commented upon the voluntary acts of
the father which resulted in his incarceration:
He not only failed to indicate parental care, but voluntarily
pursued a course of lawlessness which resulted in his imprison-
ment and inability to perform his parental duties."
This conduct, the court maintained, coupled with the lack of
communication and a failure to support the child,9" justified a
finding of abandonment.
84. See In re Adoption of Christina, 184 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1966) where the court
commented on the infrequency of the contact between the mother and her daughter by
maintaining:
On one occasion three or four years elapsed before a visit. She had not seen or
written to the child for a period of two or three years prior to this proceeding. It
is our view that the record reveals such a lack of interest as to constitute an
abandonment ....
Id. at 658.
85. Brief for Appellant at 5.
86. For the text of section 31-61, see note 67 supra.
87. In determining that the father had constructively abandoned his child, the court
implied the need of establishing more frequent communication in order to avoid the
presumption of intentional abandonment. 264 S.C. at 618, 216 S.E.2d at 539.
88. 264 S.C. at 617, 216 S.E.2d at 539, citing Bevis v. Bevis, 254 S.C. 345, 175 S.E.2d
398 (1970). See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
89. Id. at 618, 216 S.E.2d at 538.
90. In its opinion the court commented upon the father's failure to provide support
[Vol. 28
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Most jurisdictions are ambivalent as to the question of
whether imprisonment alone can justify a finding of abandon-
ment. Some evince a belief that imprisonment is an involuntary
separation from the child, and absent other circumstances, can-
not per se qualify as abandonment.9' Conversely, other courts
have reasoned that imprisonment constitutes abandonment, stat-
ing that voluntary criminal conduct "implies a conscious disre-
gard and indifference to [the child] in respect to his parental
obligations .. ". . I' Ostensibly, the South Carolina court in
for the child over an extended period of time, such failure constituting a statutory element
in determining termination of parental rights. See note 67 supra. However, an imprisoned
parent, without access to a reasonable income, is severley limited in his ability to provide
such assistance. If the court continues to focus on voluntariness as the test, it would seem
difficult to interpret a failure to provide support on these facts as abandonment.
91. In State v. Grady, 231 Ore. 65, 371 P.2d 68 (1962), the court refused to find
abandonment, even though the mother of an infant daughter was imprisoned for forgery.
While explaining that "incarceration does not legally effectuate a parental abandonment
of a child so as to waive the necessity for consent to a proposed adoption," the court also
noticed the continued concern of the mother toward her child during their separation. Id.
at 67, 371 P.2d at 69. In another case the court refused to allow an adoption over the
protest of the jailed mother. Overruling an argument that the mother's voluntary commis-
sion of a felony effected abandonment, the court maintained abandonment required intent
"rather than a separation due to misfortune or misconduct." In re Adoption of Jameson,
20 Utah 2d 53, 55, 432 P.2d 881, 882 (1967). One New York court refused to find abandon-
ment by a father imprisoned for the murder of the children's mother. In re Adoption of
Riggs, 10 Misc. 2d 617, 175 N.Y.S.2d 388, (Sup. Ct. 1958). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld an adoption over the father's protest, but determined the abandonment
began upon the father's release from prison two years before the proceeding. After the
release, the father neither communicated with the child nor provided support. In re Adop-
tion of Jacona, 426 Pa. 98, 231 A.2d 295 (1967).
Perhaps the more reasonable approach has been outlined in In re Welfare of Staat,
287 Minn. 501, 178 N.W.2d 709 (1970). Although agreeing that imprisonment per se does
not constitute abandonment, which requires that intentional relinquishment of parental
duties be evident, the court declared that imprisonment combined with other factors, such
as parental neglect, may in fact justify a finding of abandonment. While discerning the
inherent difficulty of maintaining an adequate relationship while incarcerated, the court
commented:
[If a parental relationship existed prior to the father's imprisonment and he
continued this relationship to the best of his ability during incarceration
through letters, cards, and visits where possible, and through inquiry as to his
children's welfare, his parental rights would be preserved, both because of his
actions and for the benefit of his children ....
Id. at 507, 178 N.W.2d at 713. Perhaps the reasoning of this opinion is similar to that of
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Hamby. Had the father maintained sufficient
contact with his child and evinced a genuine concern for the child's welfare, the court
likely would have denied the adoption.
92. Huston v. Haggard, 475 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1971). See also Casper v. Huber,
85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970). See generally The
Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAD. L. REv. 929 (1970) which
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Hamby may have advanced toward this latter approach.
The Hamby case was one of first impression regarding the
effect of a parent's imprisonment on the outcome of a contested
adoption. The court, however, was not faced with the issue of
incarceration alone since the father's conduct toward the child
itself indicated abandonment. Certainly there is some support in
Hamby for asserting that voluntary criminal conduct provides
justification for a finding of abandonment, but the court is likely
to continue considering the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the claimed abandonment-weighing heavily the par-
ent's conduct toward the child and the maintenance of a parent-
child relationship.
IV. ATTORNEY FEES
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently suggested to
potential litigants that it would be futile to make an equal protec-
tion argument when challenging the propriety of awarding attor-
ney fees to the wife in divorce, alimony, or separate maintenance
proceedings under the South Carolina Code.93 In Eagerton v.
Eagerton94 the appellant husband contended originally at trial
that he "should not be obligated to pay for the attorney of his wife
any more than she should be obligated to pay for his attorney."9
The court determined that this informal objection did not effec-
tively "raise and preserve the constitutional issue"9 argued on
includes a comprehensive discussion of civil disabilities of convicted persons regarding
adoption and parental rights.
93. The South Carolina Code expressly limits the award of attorney fees, together
with the award of alimony and maintenance, to wives only. See note 2 supra.
94. 265 S.C. 90, 217 S.E.2d 146 (1975). This decision culminated extended litigation
between the parties regarding an original lower court award to the wife of $1,000.00 per
month alimony and $800.00 per month child support in an action for separate mainte-
nance and support. The wife had subsequently commenced contempt proceedings seeking
her husband's compliance with the order, whereupon the husband had interjected a mo-
tion for modification of the award on the basis of a changed financial condition. The
motion for modification was denied by the lower court, and the decision was affirmed in
Eagerton v. Eagerton, 262 S.C. 206, 203 S.E.2d 380 (1974). The husband again filed for
modification due to a change of condition in his health and his financial position. The
wife responded by filing a petition and rule to show cause which sought a judgment against
the husband for past due alimony and support and which requested payment of attorney
fees and costs. In the present case the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's second denial of modification, the grant of a $35,000 judgment and the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,166.46 to the wife. 265 S.C. at 97, 217 S.E.2d at 149.
95. 265 S.C. at 96, 217 S.E.2d at 148.
96. Id. The court maintained that this casual mention of dissatisfaction with the
award was not interpreted by the lower court as a constitutional objection since the order
[Vol. 28
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appeal and thus declared the equal protection argument offered
by the appellant to be improperly before the court. Nevertheless,
the court maintained through dicta that had the issue been pro-
perly submitted, the argument could not have prevailed. Citing
two recent decisions,97 the court intimated its view that a statute
which required the husband to pay alimony, temporary alimony
or attorney fees for the wife but did not similarly require the wife
to provide such payment was not violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution.
98
Considering the current debate over equal rights for women
and sex discrimination, it is not surprising that husbands would
challenge statutes requiring only a husband to pay alimony and
attorney fees. The United States Supreme Court has declared a
legislative classification based solely upon sex with no reasonable
relation to the objective of the statute to be unconstitutional.9
Similarly in Frontiero v. Richardson,' the Court, in a plurality
opinion, suggested for the first time that sex was a suspect classi-
fication requiring strict judicial scrutiny before justification. 10
While the trend would seem to indicate that the Frontiero ration-
ale will prevail, the United States Supreme Court offered one
notable justification for sex classifications in the recent case of
Kahn v. Shevin.'0 2 The Court in Kahn found that a Florida tax
exemption inuring to widows but not to widowers served to atone
did not significantly refer to it. Id.
97. Justice Bussey referred the appellant to Stem v. Stem, 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d
78 (1973), which held a statute requiring only the husband to pay temporary alimony was
not violative of the equal protection clause because it merely reaffirmed the common law
duty of the husband to support his wife. Even though the statute did not require wealthy
wives to pay support, they had no duty at common law to provide such support. Also cited
was Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929
(1975). See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
98. 265 S.C. at 97, 217 S.E.2d at 149. Apart from this view, the court regarded the
award of attorney fees in this instance as a "necessary incident essential to the enforce-
ment of [a previously adjudicated right]." Id. at 96-97, 217 S.E.2d at 149.
99. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). This case struck down an Idaho statute which
arbitrarily preferred the appointment of males as administrators of estates. The Court
found the asserted justification of administrative convenience to be constitutionally re-
pugnant.
100. 411 U.S. 677 (1974).
101. Id. at 688. Four justices, including Mr. Justice Douglas, concluded sex classifica-
tions were inherently suspect; conversely, four justices concurred in the result but con-
cluded any holding that sex classifications were inherently suspect pre-empted a political
issue before the country in the form of the Equal Rights Amendment. Mr. Justice Rhenqu-
ist dissented.
102. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
19761
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the invariable economic disparity facing women after the death
of their husbands."3 Murphy v. Murphy,""4 cited in Eagerton,
relied upon Kahn by striking a comparison between the economic
condition facing a woman after the death of her husband and that
which faces her after the demise of her marriage. 5
While the reasoning in Kahn may be regarded as reverse
discrimination,' 6 it serves to emphasize that, although statutes
pertaining to alimony and suit money should perhaps address
themselves to the financial needs of both spouses 7 reality calls
for a consideration of those societal obstacles which preclude
many wives fom obtaining reasonable employment. For this rea-
son, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in agreement with othr
courts facing this issue, appears unwilling to uphold constitu-
tional objections at this time.
Elizabeth H. VanDoren
103. The Court explained:
There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the lone
woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the man. Whether
from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated
culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest
paid jobs.
Id. at 353. The Court added:
The disparity [in economic positions] is likely to be exacerbated for the
widow. While the widower can usually continue in the occupation which pre-
ceded his spouse's death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly
forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of
her former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer.
Id. at 354. Interestingly, three members of the court dissented on the grounds that the
statutory exemption could have been more narrowly constructed by basing it upon finan-
cial need rather than sex. Id. at 357-62.
104. See note 96 supra.
105. 232 Ga. at 353, 206 S.E.2d at 459. See also Husband M v. Wife M, 321 A.2d 115
(Del. 1974) which delineated the roles of "bread winner" and "homemaker" as the under-
lying justification for upholding property division as not violative of equal protection.
106. Conceivably, this argument will be offered by husbands who claim to suffer from
this affirmative approach of correcting previous societal "wrongs". Similar arguments
have been raised by those maintaining reverse discrimination on the basis of race. See De
Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
107. If the Equal Rights Amendment becomes law, it is suggested that such an
alteration would be mandated. See Note, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment
on the New York Alimony Statute, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 395 (1975).
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